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Under Agurs, the prosecutor should either disclose the requested
material or submit it to the trial court whenever there is a "substantial basis for claiming the suppression of the evidence might affect
the outcome of the trial."'" The trial judge should order disclosure of
the specifically requested material, before or during trial, under the
same circumstances. After trial the proper standard to evaluate
whether a defendant's due process right to a fair trail has been
violated by the failure of the prosecutor to disclose specifically requested exculpatory evidence is also whether there was a substantial basis for claiming that the suppressed material might have affected the outcome of the trial. 2 If the reviewing court finds that
there was a substantial basis for claiming the suppressed material
might have affected the outcome of the trial, the defendant's due
process right to a fair trial has been violated and a new trial should
be ordered. It is urged that the Louisiana Supreme Court reject any
further application of the Agurs standard of materiality in a general
or no request situation to instances where the prosecutor is faced
with the specific request. Otherwise, it must risk the possibility of
reversal on collateral attack.
James P. Ryan

MAKING SENSE OF RANDOM VEHICLE STOPS AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HALTING ENIGMA

Defendant's automobile was subjected to a random driver's
license and vehicle registration check, following a stop that was
neither based on a traffic or equipment violation nor based on any
criminal activity by the defendant or the other occupants of the
vehicle. The patrolman effecting the stop arrested the defendant
after having observed marijuana on the floor of the automobile. The
Delaware state courts suppressed the marijuana as evidence on the
ground that it had been obtained during an illegal detention. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed and held' that, absent artic41.
42.

See note 21, supra, and accompanying text.
See note 21, supra, and accompanying text.

1. An additional issue raised was the Court's lack of jurisdiction over the case, as
the Delaware Supreme Court had based its decision on independent and adequate
state grounds. The Court disposed of this issue by concluding that "the Delaware
Supreme Court did not intend to rest its decision independently on the state constitution and that we have jurisdiction of this case." Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391,
1395 (1979). Compare DEL. CONST. art. I, § 6, with LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (the right to

privacy guarantee).
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ulable facts that a motorist is unlicensed, that a vehicle is not
lawfully registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is
otherwise subject to seizure, the stop of an automobile and the
detention of its occupants are unreasonable under the fourth amendment.2 Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
The contemporary United States Supreme Court has created
several constitutional guarantees which, though related to the text,
are not enumerated in the Constitution.? One such guarantee embraces the right to privacy.' For purposes of the fourth amendment,
the right to privacy has been found to provide protection from unwarranted governmental searches and seizures.5 This right is em2. One should be cognizant of four essential issues when analyzing the fourth
amendment. First, it is necessary to understand the parameters of the fourth amendment to grasp the import of the judicial balancing process used in determining the
reasonableness of subjective expectations of privacy. Second, to bring the automobile
stop situation within the scope of the fourth amendment, the nature of the seizure requires evaluation. Third, a resolution of what constitutes a reasonable stop is helpful in
distinguishing it from an unreasonable detention. Fourth, an exposition of the underlying rationale of reasonable, non-probable cause stops is useful in recognizing its merits
and weaknesses. Cf. Comment, Automobile License Checks and the Fourth Amendment, 60 VA. L. REV. 666, 680 (1974) (identifying three main points of contention with
regard to the dictates of the fourth amendment in the license check context).
3. Bolner, ContemporaryLegal Pragmatism and Fundamental Freedoms, 35 LA.
L. REV. 241, 241 (1975).
4. Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), noted
that while the
Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy . . . a line of decisions . . . going back . . . as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford ... has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain . . . zones of
privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court . . .
found ... the roots of that right in the First Amendment; in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments; in the Ninth Amendment; or in the concept of liberty guaranteed
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(Citations omitted.)
5. In his dissenting opinion to Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928),
Mr. Justice Brandeis offered his view of the framers' intention for fourth amendment
construction. He wrote:
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of
the individual, whatever the means employed must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The Court has consistently
rejected this rigid position. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967). However, it has been stated that "[tihe central purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions
by government officials." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring).
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bodied in the concept of "reasonable expectation of privacy."' The
Court, in giving meaning to the phrase "reasonable expectation,"
has noted that a weighing of the government's interest 7 against the
individual's interest is required If as a result of this balancing
process, the Court concludes that an individual is justified in expecting that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and
seizures,' then an individual's privacy claim is one that must be considered constitutionally protected."0
The stopping of an automobile and its occupants raises a fourth
amendment issue only recently confronted by the Court in constitu6. The phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" is essentially a term of art
signifying that which is protected by the restrictions of the fourth amendment. See
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The recent decision of Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978), adopts the analytical guide proposed by
Mr. Justice Harlan's Katz concurrence to determine the scope of the fourth amendment's protection. Rakas imposes a twofold requirement. First, the individual urging a
privacy interest must exhibit an actual (subjective) privacy expectation. Second, the
expectation must be one that accords with societal notions of reasonableness. 99 S. Ct.
at 430-31 n.12. While Rakas places the burden upon the individual claiming a violation
of the privacy expectation to demonstrate its reasonableness, both criteria should be
satisfied in the case of the seizure of a person. Certainly one may be said to possess a
legitimate expectation of privacy over his person. See Reich, Police Questioning of
Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161 (1966). See notes 9-10, infra, and accompanying text.
7. The governmental interest sought to be preserved is the authority of a state
to act to protect "[plublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and
order ... [as] some of the more conspicuous examples ... of the police power." Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). However, the guarantees of the Bill of Rights,
through the fourteenth amendment, provide specific limitations on the permissible
scope of the police power. See, e.g., Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
8. The Supreme Court has referred to the balance of competing interests as the
"ready test for determining reasonableness." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968),
quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). See Brown v. Texas,
99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640 (1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
In balancing the effectiveness of law enforcement techniques with personal
guarantees, the Court has generally favored the individual. See, e.g., Michigan v.
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721 (1969); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89
(1964). See also Note, Almeida-Sanchez and Its Progeny: The Developing Border Zone
Search Law, 17 Aniz. L. REV. 214, 248-49 (1975).
9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
10. The text of the fourth amendment guarantees the right of the "people to be
secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See note 6, supra.
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tional terms." Much of the judicial thinking on this issue prior to
Prouse involved reasoning by analogy to the pedestrian stop situation in Terry v. Ohio." The fourth amendment's privacy protections
were found applicable in Terry as the Court held that the stop of an
3
individual, though a brief privacy intrusion, is a seizure. Similarly,
in determining whether a law enforcement stop of an automobile
and its occupants is a seizure, the Court found in United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce" that "[t]he Fourth Amendment applies to all
seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief
detention short of traditional arrest."" In making the step from
Terry to Brignoni-Ponce, the Court apparently discerned no constitutionally significant distinction between the random stop" of an
automobile and that of a pedestrian. Identifying the stop of an
automobile's occupants as a seizure within the scope of the fourth
amendment, however, does not respond to the issue of the stop's
reasonableness. 8 The problem still remains to comprehend the stan9
dard applied by the Court to validate such a limited seizure.
11. The majority in Prouse noted that "[w]e have only recently considered the
legality of investigative stops of automobiles where the officers making the stop have
neither probable cause to believe nor reasonable suspicion that either the automobile
or its occupants are subject to seizure under the applicable criminal laws." 99 S. Ct. at
1397.
12. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
13. Rejecting the argument that only a full-dress arrest constitutes a seizure
under the fourth amendment, Mr. Chief Justice Warren opined "that whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
'seized' that person." Id. at 16. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
14. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
15. Id. at 878. See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973);
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). Cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (agreeing that roadblock-type
stops of automobiles and their occupants are seizures within the province of the fourth
amendment).
16. The term random stop is used to distinguish the individualized stop of an
automobile and its occupants from a roadblock stop.
17. However, before Prouse some federal and state courts had found the two
situations distinctively different. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 442 F.2d 1146 (8th
Cir. 1971); State v. Cobuzzi, 161 Conn. 371, 288 A.2d 439 (1971). One author has noted
that "the most common view is that the Constitution permits absolute power in the
police to initiate stops of motorists to check licenses and registrations, a power which
the policy may use to serve general crime detection techniques." Comment, supra note
2, at 673.
18. See generally Comment, Nonarrest Automobile Stops: Unconstitutional
Seizures of the Person, 25 STAN. L. REV. 865 (1973). See also LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV.
40 (1968).
19. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v.
Ortiz, 423 U.S. 891 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
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The Supreme Court has established reasonableness ° as the bedrock standard in evaluating fourth amendment21 questions. Analyzing the incident of law enforcement observation of suspicious activity,
the Terry Court permitted an individual officer to conclude, in light
of his experience, that criminality might be afoot.2 The Court determined that the officer's conclusion, although premised upon his ability to state fewer objective facts than required to establish probable
cause,"3 justified a lawful stop, limited both in scope and duration, of
143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 119 (1978). Cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38
(1976) (authorizing a warrantless felony arrest based on probable cause, executed on
the arrestee's front porch); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (permitting a
warrantless felony arrest, upon probable cause, in a public place); Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89 (1964) (holding that the warrantless arrest of an individual is unreasonable
unless the arresting officer can state facts constituting probable cause); Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (permitting the arrest of an individual upon probable
cause established through the use of an informant's tip).
20. The Court often refers to "the Fourth Amendment standard of 'reasonableness,"' South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1976), concluding that the
"Fourth Amendment .

.

. prohibits only 'unreasonable searches and seizures."' Id. at

372-73, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 509-10 (1971) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). See Brown v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640 (1979); Delaware v.
Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978).
21. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). Mr. Chief Justice Warren wrote
in Terry that "the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment ... [is] the reasonableness in all circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (balancing the
safety interest of the police against the privacy intrusion of the individual required to
get out of his automobile, when lawfully stopped).
The fourth amendment is composed of two separate clauses, each prohibiting a
type of governmental activity. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325-26 (1978)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See Note, Airport Security Systems and the Fourth Amendment, 34 LA. L. REv. 860, 862 (1974). U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 1 provides: "The right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." (Emphasis added.) The second
clause sets the traditional standard for the issuance of warrants, but as the Court has
found that "lilt is well settled ... that a stop ... of a moving automobile can be made
without a warrant," Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973), the
second clause is not at issue.
22. 392 U.S. at 21. In Terry, the Court held that the stop of an individual on the
street is not offensive to the fourth amendment if the law enforcement officer can
"point to specific and articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." Id. Furthermore, the Court noted
that the facts must "be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available
to the officer at the moment of the seizure ... 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief' that the action was appropriate?" Id. at 21-22. See also Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143 (1972).
23. Probable cause arises when sufficient facts exist at the moment of arrest to
warrant a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed. See Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
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the suspicious persons.24 Finding the stop of a pedestrian and the
stop of automobile occupants analogous situations, the Court in
Brignoni-Ponce held that, despite the de minimis privacy intrusion
incident to a roving stop, the seizure was unreasonable absent articulable facts of criminality." Following Terry's guide, the BrignoniPonce Court deduced that patrolling law enforcement officers may
stop and detain automobile occupants only upon reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts." One rationale for finding the
"articulable facts stop" reasonable is that the unconstrained discretion of the officer is removed when he is required to state the facts
justifying the privacy intrusion.27
While the Court has found that articulable facts of criminality
justify a stop, its conclusion has not pretermitted all other possible
rationales rendering stops reasonable. In United States v. MartinezFuerte,8 the Court questioned the constitutionality of automobile
stops at fixed, roadblock-type checkpoints. Although recognizing
that roadblock-type stops do intrude upon the motorists' right to
free passage without interruption,29 the Court held the fixed checkpoint seizure to be reasonable 0 on two grounds. First, the interference with the privacy expectations of motorists is arguably
minimal.3" Secondly, as fixed checkpoints limit the discretion of the
24. 392 U.S. at 28. By contrast, a seizure lacking at least articulable facts of
criminality offends the fourth amendment, as the law enforcement officer's discretion
is unchecked. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). See also Note, supra
note 21, at 862.
25. The Court phrased its ruling by stating that "officers on roving patrol may
stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts . . .that reasonably
warrant suspicion." 422 U.S. at 884. One author, noting the significance of the
Brignoni-Ponce distinction between the "limited stop" of an investigative nature and
the more intrusive, full scale search of the vehicle, stated that in the former type of
situation, "the investigating officer may, if he has reasonable suspicion, question the
occupants . . .and also have them explain any suspicious circumstances." Comment,
Roving Border Searches for Illegal Aliens, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 856, 870 (1976).

26. 422 U.S. at 884. Note as well Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion stating
that "[tihe Court extends the 'suspicion' test of Terry v. Ohio to the stop of a moving
automobile." 422 U.S. at 888 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
27. See Brown v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640 (1979); United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968). Cf. Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (identifying the constitutional vice of the warrantless administrative search as the dangerous discretion left to the government agent).
28. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
29. Id. at 557-58, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
30. 428 U.S. at 566.
31. Id. at 559. Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, contended that checkpoint stops are viewed "in a different light because the subjective intrusion-the
generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably
less in the case of a checkpoint stop." Id. at 558. Unfortunately, the Court offered no
further support for its conclusion.
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individual police officer, there is less opportunity for abuse of
governmental authority.2 As a result of the balancing by the Court
of the state interest in the practical aspects of controlling criminal
activity against the individual privacy interests at issue, the fixed
roadblock in Martinez-Fuerte was found not to run afoul of the
33
fourth amendment.
Prouse serves to reaffirm the fundamental choices of reasonableness made in Terry, Brignoni-Ponce, and Martinez-Fuerte. The
Court, in Prouse, identified the legitimate expectation of privacy
that occupants of automobiles may possess: that an automobile and
its operation are the subjects of numerous governmental regulations34 does not mean the individuals operating or travelling in
32. Id. at 559. Both points are significant. As an automobile driver or passenger
can see that other vehicles are being stopped, the subjective intrusion into the privacy
interests of the individual is arguably lessened. Such a stop is probably far less
frightening and annoying than the situation where a patrolman pulls a lone automobile
over for a routine check. In the latter case, the detention likely does not seem routine
to the occupants of the stopped vehicle; and the subjective privacy intrusions are probably more severe.
The other constitutional vice of the random stop has been identified as the unconstrained discretion of the law enforcement officer. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422
U.S. 891 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). The Court in
Martinez-Fuerte suggested that if such discretion is removed, then the limited intrusion incident to the checkpoint stop is reasonable. The fixed roadblock-type stop is one
method of removing the constitutionally offensive law enforcement discretion. One
commentator has criticized the Martinez-FuerteCourt for sacrificing "the principles of
the fourth amendment for the expediency of an operation which unjustifiably burdens
. . . law-abiding motorists." Comment, Alien Checkpoints and the Troublesome
Tetralogy, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 257, 281 (1976).
33. Significantly, Martinez-Fuerte further held that "stops for brief questioning
routinely conducted at permanent checkpoints . . . need not be authorized by a warrant." 428 U.S. at 566.
34. The Court was careful to find that the regulations incident to the operation of
a motor vehicle, imposed both on the vehicle and the operator, do not befit categorizing the automobile or its operation as a subject that is pervasively regulated by the
government. Reminded that the "'grave danger' of abuse of discretion does not disappear simply because the automobile is subject to state regulation," 99 S. Ct. at 1400
(citation omitted), the Court distinguished the regulations presently at issue from the
"'relatively unique circumstances,"' id., quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 313 (1978), that permit implied consent searches, and presumably seizures, as a
consequence of engaging in an activity that traditionally has been heavily regulated.
The implied consent doctrine has been narrowly limited in application. See, e.g.,
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (federal regulation of firearms); Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (federal regulation of liquor). For an
excellent discussion of the extraordinary exceptions to the neutral standard of search
authorization, see Note, A Modern Approach to the Fourth Amendment: The Reconciliation of Individual Rights with Governmental Interests, 39 LA. L. REv. 623, 628-29
(1979). One commentator has argued that "[t]o the extent that driving is heavily regulated, a motorist may have a more limited expectation of privacy than a pedestrian ....
[T]o the extent that routine stops to check licenses are an accepted mode of regulation,
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automobiles lose all reasonable privacy expectations." Additionally,
the Court recognized the fourth amendment" implications of a
seizure" raised by the stop of an automobile and the detention of its
occupants. Deciding that the Brignoni-Ponce rationale applied to any
roving patrol stop on grounds less than a reasonable suspicion, 8 the
Court refused to construct a distinction between the intrusions occasioned by the random driver's license check stop and those occasioned by the roving border patrol stop. The Court agreed that the
proper test to determine reasonableness is a "balancing [of] the
public interest against the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
implicated by the practice of spot checks such as occurred in this
case." 9 It was determined that the random check was not sufficiently productive of evidence of highway safety violations to qualify
as a reasonable law enforcement technique under the fourth amendmotorists cannot reasonably expect to be free from them." Comment, supra note 2, at
681.
35. As the Court in Terry noted that people are not shorn of all fourth amendment protection when they step from their homes onto the public walks, the Prouse
Court appreciated that individuals are not "shorn of those interests when they step
from the sidewalks into their automobiles." 99 S. Ct. at 1401.
36. Since Prouse dealt with the actions of a state law enforcement officer, and not
a federal agent, the fourth amendment prohibitions were applied through the fourteenth amendment. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the federal exclusionary policy regarding evidence seized in contravention of the fourth amendment
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment).
37. 99 S. Ct. at 1396. The Court framed the constitutional issue by noting that
"[the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated in this case because stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' . . . even though
the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Id.
38. Id. at 1398.
39. Id. at 1397-98. Articulating the necessity of the balancing approach, the majority reasoned that "the permissibility of a particular law-enforcement practice is judged
by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Id. at 1396. The proper balance considers both. See notes 7-8, supra. This normative balancing approach has been criticized; see, e.g., Note, Area Search Warrants in Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and
Camara,84 YALE L.J. 355 (1974), but, as a general rule, the jurisprudence has favored
the individual. See note 8, supra.
For example, in an effort to promote both the individual and governmental interests, the Court has developed several standards of reasonableness based upon the
degree of law enforcement discretion and the extent of the individual privacy invasion.
While an "articulable facts" stop is certainly less accurate in identifying wrongdoers
than is a probable cause test, the permissible privacy intrusion is lesser as well. A
stop upon reasonable suspicion is only authorized for a limited duration and purpose;
only a self-protective "frisk" is reasonable. See Brown v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979);
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Probable
cause permits a custodial arrest, see, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976);
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), and a
full search of the person incident to arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415
U.S. 800 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Apparently, some dis-
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ment; ° thus, the crucial factor in the balancing seems to have been
the inefficacy of the random stop in accomplishing -its purported
goals.4
The Court held that only where articulable facts evidence that a
motorist is unlicensed, that the vehicle is not registered, or that
either the automobile or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure
for a violation of the law may an automobile and its occupants be
stopped by a roving patrolman." Prouse aligns the random automobile stop standard of reasonableness with the Terry/BrignoniPonce standard. However, Mr. Justice White, writing for the majority,
noted that the Court's holding "does not preclude the State of
Delaware or other States from developing methods for spot checks
that involve less intrusion or do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion""3 by the law enforcement officer. Specifically, the
roadblock-type stop was suggested" as one alternative.
cretion is permitted the law enforcement officer in the field when both the privacy intrusion occasioned upon the individual is slight and when some objective facts exist to
justify the intrusion. However, when either the sufficiency of factual information
decreases or when the privacy invasion inflicted increases, a different approach is required. See note 62, infra.
40. Mr. Justice White wrote:
I The marginal contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting from
a system
of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant of every vehicle on the
roads to a seizure-limited in magnitude compared to other intrusions but nonetheless constitutionally cognizable-at the unbridled discretion of law-enforcement
officials.... This kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the
Court has discerned when . . .it has insisted that the discretion of the official in
the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent.
99 S. Ct. at 1400.
41. Combining their disdain for permitting law enforcement officers to exercise
complete discretion in effecting fourth amendment intrusions with the realization of
the inefficiency of the random check in the promotion of highway safety, the majority
opined that "[i]n terms of actually discovering unlicensed drivers . . .the spot check
does not appear sufficiently productive to qualify as a reasonable law-enforcement
practice under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1399.
42. Id. at 1401.
43. Id. (Emphasis added.) By utilizing the conjunction or, separating the analysis
of spot checks and of roadblock-type stops on the grounds of lesser privacy intrusion
or lessened discretion of the law enforcement officer in effecting the stops, the inference may be drawn that a roadblock-type stop is reasonable for either reason. It is
submitted that a fixed (i.e., Martinez-Fuerte-type)roadblock stop is justifiable as such
a stop entails lesser privacy intrusions and because the discretion of the law enforcement officer is removed. Merely identifying the constitutional vice of the random stop
as either a greater privacy intrusion or a discretionary stop left in the hands of the
law enforcement officer appears improper. See Brown v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641,
(1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-59 (1976); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
44. Although Mr. Justice Rehnquist, as the Court's lone dissenter, wrote that
[t]he Court holds, in successive sentences, that absent an articulable, reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct, a motorist may not be subjected to a random
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As the Court framed the disposition in the Prouse case in terms
of an application of the reasonable suspicion test for roving stops,
its precise holding is quite unremarkable. Yet, by suggesting that
roadblock-type stops may be a reasonable means for conducting
future documentation checks, a veritable "Pandora's Box" has been
opened regarding a resolution of the reasonableness requirements of
a roadblock. Surely the Court is not implying that automobile stops,
unreasonable if randomly conducted without justifying facts, are
permissible if a law enforcement officer, acting upon his own initiative, makes the stops while standing in the center of the road. Unfortunately, a clear definition of a constitutional roadblock, applicable in the context of the instant case, has yet to be articulated by
the Court.
Although the Court in Martinez-Fuerte noted that its holding is
confined to permanent, fixed checkpoints, 5 its rationale may be helpful in predicting a course for determination of the present roadblock
license check, but that the States are free to develop "methods for spot checks
that . . . do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion," such as "[qluestioning . . . all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops ....
99 S. Ct. at 1401 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), the Court in Prouse, in fact, does not so
hold. The majority clarifies its holding by concluding that "[w]e hold only that persons
in automobiles on public roadway* may not for that reason alone have their travel and
privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police officers." 99 S. Ct. at 1401.
See also Brown v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 (1979). Mr. Chief Justice Burger, writing
in Brown for a unanimous Court, stated that Prouse required officers making automobile stops "to have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity."
45. 428 U.S. at 566 n.19. The Martinez-Fuerte majority opinion stated that "[o]ur
holding today, approving routine stops for brief questioning ... is confined to permanent checkpoints." Id. (Emphasis added.) Yet, the Court did recognize "three kinds of
inland traffic-checking operations," ic at 552, conducted by the Border Patrol and presumably any law enforcement agency concerned with the roadway police function. Roving patrols and permanent checkpoints were addressed by Brignoni-Ponce and
Martinez-Fuerte,respectively. The third identification was that of "[tiemporary checkpoints, which operate like permanent ones." I& (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the Martinez-Fuerte majority, appeared cognizant of the temporary drivers' license-type roadblocks. He wrote:
Stops for questioning, not dissimilar to those involved here, are used widely at
state and local levels to enforce laws regarding drivers' licenses, safety requirements . . . and similar matters. The fact that the purpose of such laws is said to
be administrative is of limited relevance in weighing their intrusiveness on one's
right to travel; and the logic of the defendants' position, if realistically pursued
might prevent enforcement officials from stopping motorists for questioning on
these matters in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a law was being
violated. As such laws are not before us, we intimate no view respecting them
other than to note that this practice of stopping automobiles briefly for questioning has a long history evidencing its utility and is accepted by motorists as incident to highway use.
Id. at 560-61 n.14. Significantly, "defendants' position" was not accepted or pursued.
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issue. The Martinez-Fuerte Court reasoned that fixed checkpoint
seizures are reasonable as the incident privacy intrusions are lesser
than those produced at random stops"6 and because "[t]he location of
a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by the officers in the field, but by
officials responsible for making . . . effective allocation of limited enforcement resources."' 7 Repeated in Prouse without further explanation,'8 the first proposition of the Martinez-Fuerte Court raises
several questions. Is the inquiry merely one of examining the degree
of psychological privacy intrusion experienced by automobile occupants stopped at roadblocks vis-a-vis automobile occupants subjected
to random stops? If so, then, arguably, should not the Court have
analyzed empirical data regarding the subjective fear experienced
by drivers in the two situations before reaching such a significant
conclusion?49 Or is the majority's reasoning based not upon factual
grounds but upon the reasonableness of a privacy expectation? Perhaps the individual automobile occupant may not legitimately
possess an expectation that he will not be subjected to the brief
detention and accompanying privacy intrusion occasioned by a fix4d
roadblock-type stop. Certainly, the characterization of the individual's privacy expectation as unreasonable is within the Court's
province." However, a more succinct approach to fixed roadblock
analysis finds the automobile stop not a "seizure" in the fourth
amendment sense, as no legitimate privacy interest is pierced.5
46. See notes 31-32, supra.
47. 428 U.S. at 559. The Court further "assume[d] that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively . . . . [and] a
claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is
unreasonable is subject to a post-stop judicial review." Id.
48. 99 S. Ct. at 1397. But not all of the justices summarily accepted this notion.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist put forth the caustic remark that "motorists, apparently like
sheep, are much less likely to be 'frightened' or 'annoyed' when stopped en masse." 99
S. Ct. at 1401-02 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He also frowned upon the Court's conclusion, that the possibility of a random check would not deter unlicensed drivers from
venturing onto the road, as made "without the benefit of a shred of empirical data...
suggesting that a system of random spot checks would fail to deter violators." Id. at
1402-03. See notes 40-41, supra, and accompanying text.
49. See note 48, supra.
50. See Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978). Rakas finds that the duty of a court
in determining the reasonableness of a claimed fourth amendment interest is to weigh
the claim against a societal standard of reasonableness. Unreasonable positions are to
be rejected. See note 6, supra, and accompanying text.
51. From a functional standpoint, it appears that some form of a temporary
roadblock-type stop is necessary in light of the great public concern for highway safety. If
law enforcement officers are not allowed to examine vehicle registration certificates
and driver's licenses until either a traffic violation has occurred, when the public safety has already been endangered, or at the scene of an accident, where the damage has
already been inflicted, the Court would not seem to be properly balancing the interests
involved.
Indeed, Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented, believing that the public safety interests
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Although this approach may be suggested as an analytical framework for fixed roadblocks, it is not an appropriate guide in analyzing
the more common documentation checkpoint-the temporary
roadblock.
The Court has expressed its awareness of the temporary roadblock for documentation purposes,52 but, as yet, has reserved judgment as to its legality. However, a constitutional approach similar to
that applied by the Court in the fixed roadblock case seems appropriate, using both prongs of the Martinez-Fuerte rationale as a
guide. Presumably, the same lesser-psychological-privacy-intrusion
reasoning, extant in fixed roadblock analysis, may be used in the
temporary checkpoint examination. Drivers stopped at either fixed
points or temporary roadblocks can observe others in the same circumstance, thereby lessening their subjective fear." Assuming that
the lessened intrusion premise of the Court is valid, another difficult
question is presented in determining a reasonable method for establishing the temporary roadblock. It is probable that the temporary
roadblock may not be set up solely at the whim of the officer in the
field. " Some neutral procedure appears to be a necessity, but is a
outweighed the individual privacy expectations and that the respondent failed to
demonstrate that random stops, for this purpose, are inconsistent with the fourth
amendment. 99 S. Ct. at 1403 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rather, Mr. Justice Rehnquist
reminds one that "[tihe whole point of enforcing motor vehicle safety regulations is to
remove from the road the unlicensed driver before he demonstrates why he is
unlicensed." Id at 1402 (emphasis added). See Myricks v. United States, 370 F.2d 901
(5th Cir. 1967). The fifth circuit in Myricks, reflecting that "[a]fter the event it is
always too late," contended that "[a] State can practice preventative therapy by
reasonable road checks to ascertain whether man and machine meet the legislative
determination of fitness." 370 F.2d at 904.
In light of the extensive state regulations regarding motor vehicle registration and
operation, the public safety interest appears certain. In Louisiana, see, e.g., LA. R.S.
32:51-53 (Supp. 1962); LA. R.S. 32:402 (Supp. 1954); LA. R.S. 32:861 (Supp. 1977); LA.
R.S. 32:900 (Supp. 1952). The assumption, of course, must be made that registered
vehicles and licensed drivers are safer than unregistered vehicles and unlicensed
drivers. The majority in Prouse did accept this fundamental premise. 99 S. Ct. at
1398-99.
52. See note 45, supra.
53. In United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975), the Court, in considering
fixed checkpoints, opined that "[alt traffic checkpoints . . . motorist[s] can see visible
signs of the officers' authority, and [they are] much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion."
54. The Court in Prouse specifically held that "persons in automobiles . . . may
not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled
discretion of police officers." 99 S. Ct. at 1401. The Court in Brown v. Texas, 99 S. Ct.
2637, 2640 (1979). also found that "an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is
not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the
field."
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warrant required? If so, what kind of warrant?55 With respect to
fixed checkpoints, the Court has held that establishing warrants are
not required.56 The rationale for such a conclusion further suggests
that warrants are not necessary for the establishment of a temPossibly, if the law enforcement officials58
porary checkpoint.
responsible for making the "effective allocation of limited enforce55. Again, the dual-headed hydra of the administrative-criminal warrant distinction raises its ominous spectre. Although warrants have been approved in the administrative context upon a standard less exacting than traditional probable cause in the
administrative context, see, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), such warrants have not been issued when the investigation is focused upon finding specific criminal evidence.
Only in a concurring opinion to Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
284 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring), has the suggestion been made that the "administrative probable cause" test might be legitimately applied to authorize searches, and consequently seizures, aimed at discovering criminal evidence. The issue has been the
topic of much scholarly debate. Although one writer has argued that the "suggested
[rational] search warrant procedures . . . may be the most acceptable method for
balancing the interests of the individual and the government," Comment, Judicial
Limitations on Warrantless Border Searches Made Without Probable Cause Make
Fourth Amendment Rights of Travelers Uncertain, 27 VAND. L. REV. 523, 534 (1974),
others have claimed that Mr. Justice Powell's "rational" warrant spells an erosion of
fourth amendment protections through an inappropriate use of the administrative
search exception. One commentator has stated that "[i]f they are to be any principled
and intelligible bounds on the doctrine of administrative searches, Camara's requirement that the search not be directed at discovering evidence of a crime should be interpreted to refer to the express statutory language." Note, supra note 39, at 365
(emphasis added). Another commentator has reminded "the Court [to] ... be careful to
distinguish between the balancing process in the administrative law area resulting in a
modified probable cause and the balancing in the criminal law area where probable
cause is judged by a different standard." Note, supra note 34, at 636.
Of course, the crucial question is whether the instant stops are administrative in
nature, as has been suggested, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560
n.14 (1976), or a form of criminal investigation. As the stops in question are made by
law enforcement officers (ie., state and local police), it is submitted that the stops are
more akin to criminal matters than a perfunctory administrative exercise. To hold that
a police officer acts as an administrator when effecting motor vehicle stops, and therefore is amenable to the administrative exception to probable cause in the Barlow's or
Camara sense, would truly be "a means to circumvent the fourth amendment guarantees." Note, supra note 34, at 636.
56. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976). See note 33, supra,
and accompanying text.
57. See notes 47-48, supra, and accompanying text.
58. Cf. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (holding that warrantless
"inventory searches" of lawfully impounded automobiles, pursuant to a standard
departmental procedure, are not violative of the fourth amendment). Arguably, the
same officials permitted to establish a departmental "inventory" policy could prescribe
the details for temporary roadblock stops. For a discussion of the "standard procedure" rationale of removing discretion from officers in the field, see Note, What's
Reasonable About an Inventory Search?, 39 LA. L. REV. 995 (1979).
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ment resources" develop a reasonable scheme for the conduct of
temporary roadblock stops, then the requirements of the fourth
amendment would be satisfied.
Brown v. Texas,59 decided after Prouse, lends additional support
to the notion that temporary roadblocks are legitimate if "carried
out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers."6 Fundamentally, the resolution of the
issue appears reducible to a determination of an authority constitutionally competent to approve a neutral plan establishing temporary
roadblocks. A reasonable policy establishing temporary checkpoints
could conceivably be set within a law enforcement department, thus
guaranteeing that "no significant discretion is placed in the hands of
the ...officer [in the field]"'" since the location, date, and duration
of the detentions are all predetermined.
Presumably using a dual-sliding scale approach62 to fourth
amendment analysis, the Court, in both Prouse and Brown, has implied that a limited seizure-a roadblock-type stop-survives constitutional scrutiny, without any justifying facts, when the intrusion is
slight and when the law enforcement officer's discretion is either
minimized or removed. 3 Additionally, particularized automobile
stops are considered reasonable when the nature of the intrusion is
brief and when objective facts of criminality exist to justify the
stop. 4
59. 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979).
60. Jd. at 2640.
61. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 384 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
62. The dual-sliding scale type of analysis identifies the degree of individual
privacy intrusion in comparison to the extent of discretion left in the hands of the law
enforcement officer effecting the intrusion. Both points must be concurrently analyzed
in reaching a proper determination of reasonableness. For example, when the intensity
of the privacy invasion is relatively slight, as in the case of a stop instead of a fullblown arrest, the discretion left to the individual officer may reasonably be greater
than when the intrusion is more severe. Consequently, the articulable facts of criminality standard, less than probable cause, is reasonably sufficient to justify a stop, but
not an arrest. Similarly, when the discretion of the officer in the field is completely
denied, limited privacy intrusions, such as occasioned by detention at a fixed roadblock, have been held to be reasonable, without justifying facts. One must be mindful
that the issues of privacy expectation, degree of privacy intrusion, and range of law
enforcement discretion must be thought of simultaneously.
63. See Comment, supra note 2, at 696. The author states that
[tihe limitation of reasonable supervision operates as a check on abuses of official
power to intrude upon personal security. Where the potential for abuse is high, as
in the discretionary spot check, the need for the limitation is great; where it is
negligible, as in the roadblock which stops every car, the same limitation can
serve no useful purpose and should not be imposed .... The result is a minor intrusion for a public health or safety purpose which can easily be declared reasonable.
64. See notes 26 & 42, supra, and accompanying text.
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Some troubling questions have been resolved by Prouse 5 while
others have only now surfaced."6 Further exploration into the reasonableness of temporary roadblocks is necessary to develop the full
implications of the neutral plan test of validity alluded to in Prouse
and Brown. As a result-announcing device, Prouse undeniably
reaches the proper disposition; however, until its analytical method
and its disturbing implications are better judicially articulated, the
future of fourth amendment analysis, remains, as usual,67 unsettled.
Bruce V. Schewe
65. Apparently, the Court in Prouse has extended the Terry articulable facts
standard to test the reasonableness of all random seizures of a limited nature.
66. In his concurring opinion to Prouse, Mr. Justice Blackmun, joined by Mr.
Justice Powell, seems to assume that, when the Court suggests roadblock stops as one
reasonable alternative to random stops in making license checks, "other not purely
random stops (such as every 10th car to pass a given point)," 99 S. Ct. at 1401
(Blackmun, J., concurring), are also permitted. Presumably, Mr. Justice Blackmun identifies the constitutional vice of the random stop solely as the degree of unconstrained
discretion left to the law enforcement officer in making the stop. His unusual statement would permit detention of automobile occupants, not at roadblocks of any sort
and absent a factual basis, provided the stop was not made at the discretion of the officer in the field. As this analytic perspective necessarily equates the constitutional vice
of the random stop only with the latitude of discretion, examination is not made
regarding the privacy intrusion of the persons stopped. When a motorist is halted
because his automobile is the tenth vehicle to pass a given point, the officer in the
field is undoubtedly not permitted any discretion. However, the occupants of the detained automobile suffer privacy intrusions more like that experienced at a random
stop than at a roadblock; the subjective knowledge of the persons stopped-as to the
reason for the seizure-is no greater than at a random stop.
Moreover, Mr. Justice Blackmun's proposition that the stop of every tenth vehicle
passing a given point equates with, and is even less intrusive than, a "100% roadblock
stop," id., confounds the majority's reasoning. Both the physical and psychological
privacy invasions incident to the every tenth vehicle stop ostensibly are greater than
the intrusions produced at a roadblock, permanent or temporary. Unfortunately, Mr.
Justice Blackmun offers no account for his proposition. Some rationale for his statement would be helpful in answering many of the disturbing questions it raises. When a
law enforcement patrol car is stationed at a point where every tenth vehicle may be
stopped, must every tenth automobile be stopped? What procedures are to be adopted
to ensure good faith on the part of the officers stopping "every 10th car to pass a
given point"? These questions pose difficult and confusing problems. Until serious
reflection upon the complexities of the "10th car" scheme is undertaken, the questions
will remain perplexing at best.
67. Cf. Bolner, supra note 3.

